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Individuals can now purchase their credit scores. John Galligan explains how to
interpret (and improve) scores. He also gives a personal account of how he cor-
rected his own credit history.  n 1977, the phone was considered the
speedy alternative to mail service and
“www” looked like a typo. Today, commu-
nicating with people around the nation and
world is so easy that new associations have
formed as a result of the Internet. But what
happens when laws relying on 1977 technol-
ogy and ideas about community arrive in the
twenty-first century? In at least one instance,
you get a lot of bankers, regulators, and
community groups thinking about how to
interpret the Community Reinvestment Act. 
The Community Reinvestment Act requires
banks to provide credit access and banking
services for all segments of their communi-
ties, including low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods, consistent with safe and
sound operations. A bank’s “community” is
defined by its assessment area, a geographic
region surrounding its branches and deposit-
taking automated teller machines. The need
for assessment areas arose when the practice
of redlining—literally or figuratively marking
areas on maps where banks would not
extend credit—came to be known and
protested. To ensure that banks would ade-
quately meet the needs of their entire com-
munities, the Community Reinvestment Act
was established. 
by Kristin Kanders
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moving into new territory  
COMMUNITY Difficult
Internet Banks Make Defining  
IInternet-based banks, those that do
not supplement their services with a
traditional branch or ATM infra-
structure, present a challenge to the
CRA because their “community” is
not based on geography. Because
the deposits they gather can be
from across the nation, should their
reinvestment be across the nation?
Or is nationwide reinvestment ask-
ing too much from these start-ups,
most of which have small staffs rel-
ative to asset size? To date, most
Internet banks have reinvested in
the community around their head-
quarters. The sensitive issue,
though, is that an Internet bank’s
headquarters may not be located in
an area that represents its customer
base. Also, Internet bank headquar-
ters may be unevenly distributed
throughout the United States—for
example, a large percentage are
located in the Southeast. 
Exit Hype
Five years ago, the race was on to
put traditional operations on the
Internet, with the idea that the
Internet would make operations
more efficient and cost effective.
Theory, however, has hit reality. The
costly ingredients Internet banks
wanted to avoid, such as branch
offices, real estate, and staffing,
matter to consumers. Internet bene-
fits such as home banking and
high-interest earning accounts are
attractive, but not enough to create
customer loyalty.1 In addition,
because many Internet-based insti-
tutions don’t originate loans, but
buy them on the wholesale market
through third-party brokers, they
struggle with thin profit margins.
The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation estimates that of the
nearly 10,000 FDIC-insured finan-
cial institutions in the United
States, about one-half have a web
site and about one-fifth offer trans-
actional Internet banking services. 
Of the Internet-based banks operat-
ing in 2001—various estimates
range in the few dozen—many have
retrofitted their operations to
include either branches, kiosks, or
automated teller machines. Cynthia
Bonnette, Assistant Director of the
FDIC’s Bank Technology Group,
says, “The large majority that start-
ed a few years ago have expanded
their delivery channels.” Brick-and-
click operations, such as Salem Five
Cents Savings Bank and its Internet
subsidiary directbanking.com, are
having an easier transition than
Internet-only operations, partly
?
because they can rely on current
customers to sign up for their
Internet services rather than spend
large amounts of money marketing
to a new clientele.
Some Internet-based banks, though,
have proved that they can sustain
profitability, and that’s why various
groups of people are interested in
the debate over where Internet banks
are responsible for reinvestment.
These groups care, not only because
Internet banks question how to
define communities in an era of
increasing reliance on communica-
tions technology, but because the
standards being set today may influ-
ence the scheduled revision of the
CRA in 2002.2 The Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council, an
interagency group representing the
Federal Reserve System, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Office of Thrift Supervision, Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency,
and National Credit Union Admin-
istration, is responsible for revising
the CRA next year. Lynn Bedard,
Community Affairs Liason for the
OTS Southeast Region, thinks that
“How you define an assessment area
will probably be the number one
issue in the 2002 CRA review.” 
Until 2002, and possibly after as
well, Internet banks’ CRA activities
will be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis. The regulatory agencies have
not produced guidelines for Internet-
based banks to use in defining their
assessment areas because they have
no authority to do so. Tom Venables,
President and Chief Executive Officer
of Internet-based Lighthouse Bank,
of Waltham, MA, explains his view.
“It’s difficult to figure out how to
comply with the CRA because it’s
very geographically based. To fit our
model into that world was tough.
Also, the regulators can’t provide
much guidance because they are
restricted by what the law says, so
until that changes, it’s kind of a cir-
cular problem.” But since Internet
banks have not been waiting around
for further instructions, here are
some examples of how Internet
banks and their regulators are inter-
preting CRA responsibilities.
Says Lighthouse Bank’s Tom
Venables of the approach his insti-
tution took, “What we did to meet
our responsibilities with the CRA
was to create a business plan
shaped by CRA. As a ‘de novo’
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institution, which is a ‘small’ insti-
tution in the regulation, our
requirement was to do the majority
of our lending in our assessment
area, so it’s a fairly well-defined
requirement.3 We chose Waltham
[as a headquarters location] for
business purposes and then the
question became, ‘How big do we
draw the circle?’ We decided to
focus our marketing efforts in
Eastern Massachusetts and with this
approach we came up with a logical
assessment area. We couldn’t han-
dle all of Eastern Massachusetts as
our assessment area so we chose a
60-community area starting in
Boston and moving west. So far, we
have done about 70 percent of our
lending in that assessment area.”
This approach of structuring the
bank’s business model to satisfy
CRA is not how all Internet banks
shape their businesses, nor do they
all target marketing to a geograph-
ic area. Although Lighthouse Bank,
which opened for business in June
2000, has not been profitable for its
bank holding company, Brookline
Bancorp, and is expected to be sold
to a third party or merged with
Brookline’s traditional operations
by the third quarter of this year, the
method the bank followed to com-
ply with the CRA is still instructive.
Lighthouse Bank’s lack of prof-
itability, it should be noted, is not a
result of its CRA approach, but of




NetBank, which premiered in 1996
and calls itself “The World’s
Largest Independent Internet
Bank,” is an example of a prof-
itable Internet-based bank that’s
been in business for ages, at least
Internet ages. Headquartered in
Alpharetta, GA, an Atlanta suburb,
its lending patterns have changed
as the institution has matured. In
1997, NetBank’s CRA plan was for
community reinvestment around
its headquarters. As a start-up
operation, NetBank was encour-
aged to define its headquarters area
as its assessment area. By 1999,
though, NetBank was receiving
deposits from all 50 of the United
States and 20 foreign countries.
In January 2000, NetBank submit-
ted a plan to the Office of Thrift
Supervision, regulator of federally
and state-chartered thrift institu-
tions, detailing how it could imple-
ment a national CRA program. Says
their CEO D.R. Grimes, “When we
started, we were making about 50
percent of our loans in Atlanta and
received about 25 to 30 percent of
our deposits from there. As we got
bigger our percentages shrank and
it became clear that we were going
to be national. With less than 15
percent of our market now in
Georgia, it would be difficult to
comply with CRA—it would be fis-
cally irresponsible.” The “fiscal irre-
sponsibility” Grimes is referring to
is that compliance with the CRA
might suggest doing a majority of
loans in an assessment area, yet
safety and soundness regulators
wouldn’t want such a high concen-
tration of loans—especially a high
concentration in low- and moder-
ate-income loans—to be made in an
area that isn’t representative of its
customer base. 
What NetBank received OTS
approval for in March 2001 is to
reinvest in three communities that
are its biggest business generators:
California, Georgia, and Florida.
NetBank’s strategic plan, which
outlines its CRA goals and
No one knows yet which track
Internet banks will follow.tion in Commerce Bank’s public
evaluation, the document each fed-
eral regulator produces after exam-
ining a bank for CRA compliance,
states: “Commerce Bank’s assess-
ment area includes some of
Metropolitan Atlanta’s most afflu-
ent areas. None of the census tracts
in the Fulton County portion of the
assessment area are designated as
either low- or moderate-income.”
Likewise, Telebank, which was
acquired by E*TRADE Bank in
January 2000, had an assessment
area in Arlington, VA, which con-
tained, “no low-income census
tracts. . . .” Community advocates
are also wary that the affluent sub-
urbs of Silicon Valley, Atlanta, and
Washington, DC, where many of the
banks are located, may dispropor-
tionately receive reinvestment ben-
efits at the expense of lower-
income neighborhoods in the
United States.
CRA Evaluation Standards
To foster creativity with the CRA,
OTS Director Ellen Seidman has
encouraged Internet banks to pre-
pare “strategic plans.” Regulators
and Internet bankers agree that
strategic plans are a useful tool for
complying with the CRA until
the regulation is amended.
Lynn Bedard of the OTS
believes that “All Internet
banks should consider the
strategic plan option for
their CRA compliance
because it is very difficult
for a retail lender, using
the Internet as its primary
outlet, to comply with the
regulation. Filing a strate-
gic plan,” she adds, “enables
an institution to identify and
get maximum credit for its
approach, states that should its cur-
rent market demographics change,
so will its CRA plan. NetBank’s
strategy of CRA lending in three
areas is a “great resolution,” says
Grimes because, while demonstrat-
ing how to be creative with CRA, it
roughly matches loans with
deposits and so is in keeping with
the spirit of community reinvest-
ment. Lynn Bedard, who worked on
behalf of the OTS to help NetBank
develop its strategic plan, says of
the plan, “It probably isn’t perfect,
but it’s a start.”
To some, that might be an under-
statement. But even so, a strategic
plan is often considered to be a bet-
ter solution than having Internet
banks automatically choose their
headquarters as their assessment
areas. Home base designations con-
cern community advocates who feel
that Internet banks unfairly limit
their areas for reinvestment. For
example, ebank, formerly under the
name Commerce Bank, has its
headquarters area as its assessment
area. The reinvestment area descrip-
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strengths.” The strategic plan is an
option that has so far been used pri-
marily by wholesale and credit card
institutions to guide CRA reinvest-
ment. The plans allow banks to set
their own standards for how their
CRA compliance should be judged,
rather than rely on the standard
lending, service, and investment test
mix, which values lending about
twice as heavily as services and
investments. The strategic plan
became part of CRA regulation in
1995. Its greater flexibility works
better for institutions with nontradi-
tional communities. To become
valid, the plans must be submitted
for public comment and may under-
go regulator-suggested revisions. 
Some Internet banks do not have
strategic plans, nor do they have
CRA compliance evaluated by the
standard CRA tests for either
“small” or “large” financial insti-
tutions. This is because they oper-
ate as wholesale, as opposed to
retail, banks, which means that
they do not originate loans direct-
ly but buy them on the wholesale
market. Regulators of wholesale
and limited-purpose banks use the
Community Development Test to
assess community development
services, investments, and lending
in total, rather than separately. If a
wholesale bank does not directly
make loans, the theory goes, it’s
more difficult for it to earmark
lending to an area when it doesn’t
make loans in the first place.
Telebank operated as a wholesale
bank until it was bought by
E*TRADE Bank. In fact, because
Internet banks often operate in
this manner, Bank of Internet USA
has turned its retail status into a
marketing tool. It emphasizes on
its website, “Many so-called ‘on-
line lenders’ are actually mortgage
brokers or simple lead generation
web sites. Bank of Internet USA,
however, is a direct portfolio
lender.” As D.R. Grimes, a direct-
lending Internet banker, has spec-
ulated, wholesale Internet banks
may be afraid of doing direct
lending nationwide because they
don’t know how to handle the
CRA implications.
Strategic plans and Community
Development Tests have value in
making CRA compliance flexible
for different kinds of banking insti-
We need to update our concept of communi-
ty to reflect today’s marketplace. . . . This is
by no means a simple problem to solve. . . .
there are aspects of the regulations, as we
all know, that do not work particularly well
in today’s market of Internet banks, nation-
wide lending, alternative delivery, and
deposit-gathering mechanisms.
Ellen Seidman, OTS Director
October 2000 speech
Internet Value
Bankrate.com, in a 2001
survey of consumer finan-
cial products, determined
that Internet banks surpass
their brick and mortar com-
petition on the checking
account front. Eighteen of
the top 20 checking
accounts were associated
with Internet banks.interagency CRA question and
answer section. The specific ques-
tion addresses the need for immedi-
acy or direct benefit of community
reinvestment on an institution’s
assessment area. The answer is that
immediacy and direct benefit do
not have to be shown as long as the
“purpose, mandate, or function of
the organization or activity
includes serving geographies or
individuals located within the insti-
tution’s assessment area.”4 This
statement has encouraged Internet
banks, such as G & L Bank, to pur-
sue compliance with the CRA in




G  & L Bank, a $90-million-asset
bank that caters to the gay and les-
bian community, serves its assess-
ment area by caring for the needs
of its nationwide community, of
Bank of Internet USA, a $120 mil-
lion asset bank that opened on the
Fourth of July 2000 and is looking
to be profitable by its one-year
anniversary, thinks that his bank
can meet the needs of its communi-
ty by reinvesting according to the
current regulation. He’ll be more
confident, of course, after the CRA
review his bank is scheduled for in
June. Says Evans of his San Diego-
based bank, “We don’t think we will
need to develop a strategic plan,”
but he is hoping that the CRA will
be revised to “address the realities
of our market.” 
The nationwide approaches sug-
gested by First IB and NetBank,
however, are only theoretical. While
alternative approaches to fulfilling
the CRA are being debated, some
Internet banks are managing to fit
their triangle of an operation into
the CRA regulation square by mod-
eling CRA activities on a method of
compliance discussed in the FFIEC’s
tutions, but community groups fear
that lending, the crux of CRA’s
impact and the most heavily
weighted factor a regulator uses to
assess a CRA rating for a typical
retail institution, may become
diluted—especially if Internet bank-
ing becomes more powerful. The
Woodstock Institute, a Chicago-
based nonprofit that promotes com-
munity reinvestment, considers
strategic plans to be imperfect
because they allow banks to set the
thresholds for attaining a certain
CRA rating as low or high as they
want. The Woodstock Institute sug-
gests looking at market share to
determine assessment areas for
Internet banks. Its position is that
for each MSA, Internet institutions
with 0.05 percent of the market
share of a particular product should
have a CRA obligation for at least
that product in that area. For insti-
tutions that don’t have 0.05 percent
of the market share in any areas,
then the institutions should look
nationally at the ratio between
lending to low- and middle-income
groups and middle- and upper-
income groups. “Ideally,” says the
Institute’s Katy Jacob, “the ratio
should be one or higher.”
Some Internet bankers believe that
a solution to fulfilling CRA will
develop from looking nationally—
although in a different manner than
the Woodstock Institute proposes.
Bob Connors, Community Affairs
Officer of First Internet Bank of
Indiana (First IB), says, “Because we
operate with the entire country as
our marketplace, we think that any
loan we can make to that targeted
[LMI] market should qualify toward
our CRA commitment.” First IB,
which is classified as a “small insti-
tution,” currently has an assessment
area consisting of two counties
around its Indianapolis headquar-
ters. He adds, “With the Internet-
business model, we don’t have geo-
graphic control over our customer
base—we have the entire country—
so we need to come up with some
creative solutions to measuring
CRA compliance.” 
D.R. Grimes of NetBank also thinks
that meeting the national LMI per-
centage with the number of loans
an Internet bank makes is “appro-
priate; it’s a reasonable approach.”
Another Internet banker, Gary
Lewis Evans, President and CEO of
Legislation to address how a financial institution (includ-
ing Internet-only banks) should fulfill CRA requirements
was reintroduced to the House of Representatives on
March 6, 2001, by Representatives Thomas Barrett and
Luis Gutierrez. 
The Community Reinvestment Modernization Act, which
has since been referred to two subcommittees of the
House Committee on Financial Services, has 33 cospon-
sors and calls for expanding a financial institution’s
assessment area to each community in which the finan-
cial institution makes more than 0.5 percent of its loan
volume and each state in which it has a branch outside
the metropolitan area. 
The legislation was drafted by the National Community
Reinvestment Coalition, a community advocacy group.
As in the current regulation, the assessment area would
also include metro areas in which the financial institution
has one or more branches. 
This legislation faces strong opposition, as it did during
the Clinton Administration, because it calls for expand-
ing CRA obligation areas and extending CRA obligations
to lending affiliates of financial institutions that are cur-
rently exempt under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, such
as insurance companies and mortgage banks. It is also
opposed because it calls for increased reporting of Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act data.
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Tracking CRA PolicyReaching out to the local communi-
ty through technology is also pop-
ular with Internet banks, for obvi-
ous reasons. Lighthouse Bank’s Tom
Venables believes that it is impor-
tant “to expand the technology rev-
olution to those behind the curve,
to expand computer literacy.” To do
this they forged an alliance with
the Charles River Computer Center,
a nonprofit organization that offers
free training and computer time to
the Waltham community. NetBank
also plans to focus on technology.
As stated in their strategic plan, one
of their service goals is to “Form a
partnership with an organization
[that] serves the low- and moder-
ate-income community, to provide
computers and Internet access with
a goal of bridging the digital divide
and providing these communities
with more low-cost banking prod-
ucts and services.” This type of
community outreach, which di-
verges from traditional CRA activi-
ty, makes sense to Internet bankers
because it provides them with a
way that they can complement (and
avoid competition from) what tra-
ditional banks currently do for
community outreach. 
In Our Future
These examples show how Internet-
based banks are finding ways of
reinvesting that relate to the commu-
nities they serve. They present one
method of community reinvestment
that Internet banks are following,
and one method that regulators are
our customers and is why home
mortgages for same-sex couples
has been our strongest product
offering. Small-business owners
too tell us that discrimination hap-
pens.” In this way, Internet banks,
often thought of as threatening to
traditional community reinvest-
ment, may turn out to encourage
credit access for nontraditional
communities that sometimes feel
disenfranchised from the banking
world—just not by income.
Other communities that may be
better targeted by the Internet than
by a traditional bank include ethnic
groups. Bancointernet bills itself, in
three languages, as the “Personal
Finance Community for Latinos.” It
offers products such as mortgages
for nonresidents, international
money transfers, and financial
information that is geared toward
Hispanic and Brazilian communi-
ties living or newly arrived in the
United States. Bancointernet, how-
ever, is a misnomer, as it does not
provide transactional banking serv-
ices. VirtualBank is a bank for tech-
nology professionals, and it is
offered through technology firms.
Its special services include things
that the technology-savvy appreci-
ate, such as a single database that
holds a person’s entire financial
portfolio, from mortgages to check-
ing accounts. These financial
providers are finding lifestyle, eth-
nic, and professional niches and are
redefining what it means to have a
banking relationship. 
which the assessment area popula-
tion is a part. (Its assessment area
consists of Pensacola, Florida, plus
two neighboring counties.) G & L
Bank specializes its direct commu-
nity reinvestment in Pensacola by
supporting gay and lesbian com-
munity groups, programs that pro-
vide medicine for people with HIV,
AIDS, or other diseases, and pro-
grams that provide sustenance and
financial assistance to those in
need. Primarily, though, it views
its community impact in broad
terms as a national provider of
affordable loans and mortgages to
gay and lesbian individuals, cou-
ples, and companies.
The G & L Bank model seems new
to the financial services industry
because its community is based
neither on geography nor on
income. Internet banks, by virtue
of their reliance on computer-liter-
ate and generally computer-own-
ing customers, and because some
of  them are linked to brokerage
houses, attract higher-income cus-
tomers than traditional banks. But
G & L Bank is a prime example of
how Internet banks are illuminat-
ing new communities that need
access to credit. CRA Officer Bill
Knight says that G & L Bank serves
a community that is not being
served by traditional means. “The
gay couples we serve tell us that
traditional banks typically do not
allow gay couples to use their joint
income to qualify for mortgages or
loans. This is a major issue with
As Gary Lewis Evans
of Bank of Internet
USA says, “We are
convinced this is the
way of the future.”9c  &  b
Comments on this article? E-mail
kristin.kanders@bos.frb.org
Endnotes
1. OTS Director Ellen
Seidman remarked in a
September 2000 speech that
“. . . we have observed that,
in most cases, Internet-only
institutions are forced to pay
very high rates in order to
acquire customers. As soon
as they lower their rates, the
deposits flow out. Thus, the
second conclusion we have
drawn is that most Internet-
only institutions attract pri-
marily non-core deposits.
This ‘hot money’ comes from
depositors who are simply
seeking high interest rates
and have no loyalty toward
one particular institution.”
2. Regulators expect to
release a document request-
ing public commentary on
CRA this June. In addition to
the topic of Internet bank
compliance, it may also
request comments on bank
mergers, exam processes,
and the investment test.
3. “Small” institutions are
characterized as those with
assets of less than $250 mil-
lion or less than $1 billion
in assets if it is a part of a
bank holding company. To
satisfy CRA, small institu-
tions are supposed to do a
majority of their lending
within their assessment
areas. Large institutions, on
the other hand, are those
with assets of $250 million
or more or assets of more
than $1 billion if in a hold-
ing company. Large institu-
tions are evaluated for CRA
according to three tests:
lending, service, and invest-
ment. The lending test typi-
cally weighs twice as heavi-
ly as the other two tests.
4. An excerpt from the
answer reads, “Therefore, an
institution’s activity is con-
sidered a community devel-
opment loan or service or a
qualified investment if it
supports an organization or
activity that covers an area
that is larger than, but
assessing. Because there is no uni-
form policy on how Internet banks
should fulfill CRA, many other rein-
vestment examples can be found.
The FFIEC policymakers have a
short history to rely on for some big
decisions. Only a handful of
Internet banks have been examined
for CRA compliance to date, and
most of them have been regulated
as “small banks,” which limits their
reinvestment obligations to their
headquarters assessment area.
NetBank’s strategic plan, the first
one approved (in March 2001) for
an Internet bank, has stirred debate
about its strength and weaknesses.
The policymakers, who will take
into account the positions of com-
munity advocacy groups and regu-
lation-averse bankers, have a tough
job ahead of them. 
But the Internet banking industry
too has encountered strife in its
young life. Some Internet banks
have witnessed a decline in venture
capital; others haven’t been able to
turn profits, have changed their
business plans to include branches,
or have been bought by a tradition-
al banks, brokerages, or Internet
conglomerates. Some are trying to
remain Internet-only. While it’s dif-
ficult, there are business reasons for
remaining in the field. Of the
numerous dot-com businesses out
there, Internet bankers believe that
few are as well suited for the
Internet as financial services. As
Gary Evans of Bank of Internet USA
says, “We are convinced this is the
way of the future.” At the end of the
day, his bank is doing “basic, pure
banking” without the high over-
head. Yes, Internet banks may have
eradicated the need for the middle-
man, along with our quaint ideas of




area need not receive an
immediate or direct benefit
from the institution’s spe-
cific participation in the
broader organization or
activity, provided the pur-
pose, mandate, or function
of the organization or activ-
ity includes serving geogra-
phies or individuals located
within the institution’s
assessment area. Further-
more, the regulations permit
a wholesale or limited-pur-
pose institution to consider
community development
loans, community develop-
ment services, and qualified
investments wherever they
are located, as long as the
institution has otherwise
adequately addressed the
credit needs within its
assessment area(s).” For the
entire question and answer,
see section .12(i) &
563e.12(h)-5 of the intera-
gency CRA Q&A.W
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Art’s Economic Power 
in New England
by Kathleen Gill
We must never forget that art is not a form
of propaganda, it is a form of truth.
-John F. Kennedy
Art is making something out of nothing and
then selling it.
-Frank Zappa
hen  TIME magazine’s “100 People Who
Made the Millennium” were named, twen-
ty-five were artists. Our admiration for
artistic people and places is such that one
of the measures of a community’s desir-
ability is the amount of art and cultural
activities available to its citizens. Art is
also big business.  
In New England, nonprofit cultural organ-
izations and attractions generate $3.9 bil-
lion dollars in annual revenue and support
110,000 jobs, according to the New
England Foundation for the Arts. Further,
this estimate covers only a small portion of
the arts “industry.” An inclusive definition
of arts and culture can include movies,
music, graphic design, publishing, and
other businesses. Together these enterprises
make up the “Creative Economy,” accord-
ing to a June 2000 report by the New
England Council.
Using a broader definition of art, including
enterprises and individuals that directly
and indirectly produce cultural products,
the Creative Economy supports more than
245,000 jobs in the region, and 3.5 percent
of New England’s job base. In dollar terms,
New England attracts $6.6 billion in rev-
enues from cultural tourism alone.
However, this is just part of the value pro-
duced by the Creative Economy. Businesses
and workers are attracted to the New
England region and to particular commu-
nities because of the quality of life.
Fortunately, the New England Council proj-
ects that Creative Economy jobs will grow
18 percent over the next ten years.
Seeing the Path of the Wind,by Stacy Levy is a wind installation
currently on display at Mass MoCA.Eight strategically placed
fans replicate wind patterns detected from the museum’s
rooftop and “breeze” onto the flags.While art has many positive eco-
nomic and social effects, it also has
many expenses that the economy at
large is asked to subsidize. For
example, museums on average gen-
erate only a fraction of their operat-
ing revenue from admission sales.
According to a 1995 survey of 174
member institutions of the
Association of Art Museum
Directors, the average cost per
museum visitor was $30, while
admission fees per visitor averaged
$1.45. To cover the revenue gap, in
1995 the public sector contributed
$281 million to museums and the
private sector contributed $372 mil-
lion. By this fiscal measure, muse-
ums are an economic drain, not an
economic engine. Art and culture’s
impact has traditionally been meas-
ured with this model, and it is
viewed not as a moneymaking
enterprise, but as an expense.
But the economic model of art is
changing. A more contemporary and
practical way of viewing the arts
economy is through an example
provided by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland. The Bank exam-
ined the economic impact of
Playhouse Square, a cultural enclave
in downtown Cleveland. To describe
the relationship of the public sector
investment to the enterprise, the
Bank used the metaphor of a ski
resort. It noted that the ski lifts in a
resort are a “loss leader,” designed to
attract visitors to the resort. The ski
resort makes its profits from the sur-
rounding vacation condominiums,
time-shares, restaurants, and other
retail activity that subsidize the ski
lifts as a business expense. In an art
investment, the public sector acts as
a ski resort, creating an enterprise
that attracts visitors, who in turn
generate sales tax dollars and
increase property values. This
metaphor is accurate in that muse-
ums attract visitors who then
patronize a variety of businesses in
the community.
Several examples of how art and cul-
ture play a role in revitalization
efforts can be found in New England.
Pittsfield, Massachusetts, is incorpo-
rating cultural activities into a larger
downtown revitalization strategy.
North Adams, Massachusetts, is ben-
efiting from the opening of a large
museum complex and Providence,
Rhode Island, is using art as a cen-
terpiece for downtown renewal.
Pittsfield, Massachusetts
The Berkshires of Massachusetts
have long been a cultural magnet
for the East Coast. Tanglewood, the
summer home of the Boston
Symphony Orchestra, has been a
summer attraction for over 70 years.
Berkshire County attracts an esti-
mated 2 million visitors per year,
most in the summer months. While
the southern section of Berkshire
County has prospered, the central
and northern regions have not been
so fortunate. Pittsfield, located in
central Berkshire County, is attempt-
ing to reverse this trend with a
downtown revitalization plan that
emphasizes cultural and entertain-
ment activities.
Pittsfield has historically been an
industrial center in western
Massachusetts. However, in the late
1980s, General Electric closed two
of its three divisions in Pittsfield. At
the same time, General Dynamics
closed its plant following defense
spending cutbacks. As a result of
the two closings, 8,000 workers
were displaced. Many left the area
and Pittsfield’s population has been
in decline since the plant closings.
In addition, retail stores moved
from downtown to malls on the
edge of town. As a result of these
events, the downtown stores had a
30 percent vacancy rate as of three
years ago.
To combat the blight that was tak-
ing over downtown Pittsfield, a
group of business owners, known as
Downtown, Inc., decided that a
plan was needed. Downtown, Inc.
approached the remaining large
businesses and asked for a three-year
monetary commitment to develop a
revitalization strategy. Armed with
$50,000 per year for three years,
Downtown, Inc. hired the Berkshire
Housing Development Corporation
for a revitalization strategy. 
Berkshire Housing’s approach was
pragmatic. They proposed public/pri-
vate partnerships and a combination
of rehabilitation of historic buildings
for commercial space and cultural
activities to bring people downtown.
In the past, large-scale development
projects were proposed, but no
developers could be found to take the
risk a major development required.
Berkshire Housing developed an
incremental strategy consisting of
three parts with a total plan cost of
$25 million. The first part of the plan
was to develop office space, which
was in short supply in Pittsfield. The
second part was to restore some his-
toric buildings and tear down non-
historic abandoned buildings. The
third part of the plan was to develop
a cultural action strategy for
Pittsfield. The cultural action  strate-
gy was developed by Hunter Interests
Inc. and contained a set of strategic
steps aimed at utilizing existing
assets more effectively, then devel-
oping new facilities.
The strategic plan for Pittsfield con-
sisted, first, of using the Berkshire
Museum, an art and natural history
museum located in downtown
Pittsfield, as a centerpiece. The rec-
ommendation was to focus funding,
human resources, and regional mar-
keting support on the Berkshire
Museum. Since this recommendation
was made, the Berkshire Museum
has hired a new director, revamped
its exhibits, and doubled annual vis-
itors from 30,000 to 60,000.
The Berkshire Museum attracts twice as many
visitors as before Pittsfield’s revitalization plan.Second, the strategic plan suggested
that Pittsfield restore and reopen the
Colonial Theatre, a historic theatre
located in downtown. After having
been closed for several decades, it is
now being used as an art supply
store. Currently, a nonprofit group
has an option to purchase and reha-
bilitate the Colonial Theatre to its
original use. Part of the restoration
proposal is to include a Theatre
Museum within the structure to
focus fund-raising activities and
raise awareness of the project.
Hillary Clinton helped to generate
publicity for the theatre when she
visited it last year as part of her tour
of America’s hidden treasures.
Third, the plan called for developing
the North Street Arts Collaborative,
a private venture launched by indi-
viduals in Pittsfield. It offers studio
space and art classes for Pittsfield
area residents. Other recommenda-
tions in various stages of develop-
ment include a new cinema com-
plex, a stadium, and an arts center.
Art is a viable economic engine in
Pittsfield because of the city’s geo-
graphic location between two major
cultural centers. To the south,
Tanglewood, Jacobs Pillow, and a
summer Shakespeare Company all
attract seasonal art patrons from
Boston and Albany. To the north,
The Massachusetts Museum of
Contemporary Arts (Mass MoCA)
opened two years ago. It has attract-
ed visitors who make day trips
through Pittsfield to the North
Adams museum. Also, Pittsfield had
been holding “Art Walks,” an annu-
al festival in which artists set up dis-
plays in the vacant storefronts of the
downtown area. The Art Walks start-
Now showing—an art supply store.
Pittsfield hopes to reopen the
Colonial Theatre to its original use.
A decaying building in the Central Block area of Pittsfield (above) may soon look like
Berkshire Housing Development Corporation’s plan (below).Because public monies did not fund
Mass MoCA in full, it began to look
elsewhere for revenue and reshaped
its concept for greater economic via-
bility. Instead of being designed as a
pure art museum, Mass MoCA has
developed a performance arts compo-
nent and rents one-third of its
250,000 square feet to private busi-
nesses. The performance arts section
of the museum contains a 10,000
square-foot black box theatre with
seating capacity of 650, another
smaller theatre, and a summer open-
air cinema. Nearly 20,000 people
annually attend one of its performing
arts events. Including office space in
a museum complex is unusual, but it
has provided many benefits. For
example, several new businesses have
been attracted to North Adams by the
space. Presently Mass MoCA’s tenants
employ almost 350 people.
Companies such as Kleiser-Walczak
Construction Company, a computer
animation company, and eZiba.com,
an online gift retailer, have settled in
North Adams, attracted by Mass
MoCA’s unique image.
Mass MoCA has renovated 250,000
square feet of a potential 750,000
square feet at a cost of about $65 per
square foot. This is a remarkable
achievement because museum reno-
vation is generally between 10 and
30 times as expensive. One reason
for the low cost of renovation has
been the design technique practiced
by Bruner/Cott & Associates, the
firm hired to redesign the space.
These architects work with the exist-
ing structure and design renovations
to suit the building. The technique is
aptly called architecture from found
buildings. The result in this case is a
In the late 1980s Tom Krens, who
was Director of the Williams College
Museum of Art, conceived of the
concept for Mass MoCA. He was
motivated by the observation that
modern art was becoming larger in
scale and at the same time, exhibit
space in New York was becoming
more expensive. When Krens
pitched his idea to the Mayor of
North Adams, he originally had
another North Adams building in
mind, but the Mayor suggested the
Sprague buildings.
After hiring Joseph Thompson as
director of the project, Krens left to
become the director of the Solomon
L. Guggenheim Museum in New
York. The project was thought to
require about $35 million dollars in
public funds from the state of
Massachusetts. Governor Dukakis
enthusiastically supported the plan
as a way of revitalizing North
Adams. He approved the plan and
Mass MoCA began to conduct its
feasibility study. 
Soon after, Governor Weld, who did
not support the plan for financial
reasons, was elected. After lobbying
from several members of the legis-
lature, including then-Senator Jane
Swift, Weld agreed to consider the
museum if North Adams could
demonstrate its support by raising
$1 million. The North Adams com-
munity managed to raise the money
quickly through a grassroots cam-
paign, which caught the Governor’s
attention. After several more
rounds of negotiation, Weld agreed
to a three-to-seven match of funds,
for the bricks and mortar portion of
the project. 
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ed in 1996 and raise awareness of
art and culture in this traditionally
working-class town.
One of the concerns of the cultural
revival is that it may suffer dispro-
portionately in the case of an eco-
nomic downturn. While it seems log-
ical that during weak economic peri-
ods people will spend less on leisure
activities and vacations, Pittsfield
does not believe it will be severely
affected. “During the last recession
we saw very little decline in the
number of visitors. When times are
lean, people take shorter vacations
and many choose trips to the
Berkshires,” says Peter Lafayette of
Berkshire Housing. The Berkshires’
economy may also be more stable
because of the number of wealthy
individuals choosing to summer near
Tanglewood, as evidenced by the
number of expensive new homes
being built in the area.
The results of Pittsfield’s revitaliza-
tion have been excellent, so far. The
storefronts in downtown, which
once had a 30 percent vacancy rate,
now have a 15 percent vacancy rate
and falling. Investment dollars are
flowing into downtown develop-
ment of offices and stores. Recently,
one of three major banks located in
town completed a new $1 million
building on the site of an aban-
doned department store. Other
building owners have seen their
property values double in the past
five years. While the art and cultur-
al aspect of the revitalization can-
not take all of the credit, it has cer-
tainly played an important part in
bringing people downtown.
North Adams, Massachusetts
In some ways the development of
Mass MoCA (Massachusetts Museum
of Contemporary Arts) in North
Adams is similar to Pittsfield’s revi-
talization. The two communities
share similar economic histories—
both suffered when major manufac-
turing plants closed. In the case of
North Adams, Sprague Electric left
in the 1980s. Sprague had employed
4,000 people in a town of 18,000.
Almost every family in North Adams
was affected by the plant closure.
Sprague vacated 27 brick industrial
buildings located on 13 acres in
downtown, about one-third of the
downtown area. After trying unsuc-
cessfully to sell the buildings,
Sprague eventually donated them to
North Adams.
Kiki Smith’s Constellation is a creation that’s not meant to be hung on the
typical gallery wall; it finds ample space at Mass MoCA.set of large airy spaces to house each
of the large artworks. Mass MoCA is
the largest contemporary art muse-
um in the United States, with
exhibits including a large-scale
bronze sculpture and Uberorgan,
designed by Tim Hawkinson, who
describes it as a giant self-playing
reed organ.
The economic benefits of Mass
MoCA are just beginning to be real-
ized. During its first two years of
operation, the museum attracted
100,000 visitors per year and anoth-
er 20,000 visitors annually attended
the performing arts events. In
response to the influx of visitors,
new restaurants have begun to open
in North Adams. The Holiday Inn in
North Adams has seen a 75 to 80
percent increase in occupancy. A
new inn, The Porches at Mass MoCA,
is scheduled to open in July. Finally,
property values in North Adams
have begun to rise, after several
years of stagnation and devaluation.
In all, Mass MoCA has done what it
set out to do, breathe life back into
North Adams. The museum has been
open for just two years, so it will
take several more to measure its
long-term impacts.
Providence, Rhode Island
Providence presents an interesting
counterpoint to the two industrial
towns in Massachusetts that were
looking to reshape their economies.
In Providence, revitalization through
the arts is one part of the city’s much
larger revitalization effort. While
North Adams and Pittsfield suffered
dramatic downturns when powerful
employers left, Providence suffered
from a long-term malaise exacerbat-
ed by the early 1990s recession.
Currently, the situation is quite dif-
ferent. Providence is experiencing a
renaissance. Like the other examples,
Providence has built on its cultural
and artistic strengths and resources.
The city has enjoyed a long history
of art involvement thanks to the
Rhode Island School of Design and
Brown University, both of which are
located in Providence.
Providence has actively encouraged
its art community through a variety
of initiatives that may have been
inspired by one organization,
AS220, formed fifteen years ago.
AS220 is an art community located
in downtown Providence. The name
is derived from Alternative Space
and the street number of the original
address. The 22,000




Almost ten years ago,
a small group of
artists representing
AS220 approached
Mayor Cianci with the
idea of renovating a
building and creating
a live/work space for
artists. Although AS220
had a budget of just
around $100,000, the
Mayor listened and supported its
effort. Through volunteer fund-rais-
ing, Community Development Block
Grants, grants from the Federal
Home Loan Bank, and loans from
three local banks, AS220 financed a
$1.1 million renovation that now
houses low-income artists and pro-
vides unjuried performance and
gallery space to Rhode Island artists.
To support the arts, the city institut-
ed a special tax relief program that
provides sales tax relief to artists
selling their work in the Providence
Arts District. The city also offers a
lower property tax rate to landlords
who redevelop space for artists. 
Providence also honors contributors
to the arts with annual awards.
Business Volunteers for the Arts,
Rhode Island, presents a series of
awards for various accomplishments.
Examples include the Encore Award
for corporate leadership in support of
cultural initiatives, the Individual
Achievement Award for outstanding
volunteerism, and the Arts Advocate
Award for fundraising contributions.
A city of only 160,000 people,
Providence is considered dispropor-
tionately rich in artistic talent. “Art
contributes to our sense of place.
Providence wants to keep its artists,”
explains Catherine Horsey of the
Providence Preservation Society.
Tim Hawkinson’s giant organ was designed with Mass
MoCA in mind.
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Perhaps it is the sense of place asso-
ciated with art that makes artistic
expression desirable both to resi-
dents and visitors. While some areas
of modern cities may look inter-
changeable, the cultural institutions
and works of art make a place
unique, providing identity. Since
artists are known for seeing the
potential beauty around us, it is not
surprising that artists are attracted to
areas that need renovation. Perhaps
it takes an artist’s vision to show us
the potential of neglected areas. As
an ever-growing number of New
England communities can attest,
support for the arts is an investment
in a community’s future and can be
the first step in revitalization.
Comments on this article? E-mail
kathleen.m.gill@bos.frb.orgn January 29, 1991,
Florence Hagins, an
African-American sin-
gle mother with a
moderate income who
had been denied a
mortgage once before,
became the first person to purchase a
home with the assistance of Boston’s
new Soft Second Mortgage Program.
Almost exactly ten years later, in
early February 2001, she stood before
350 people as co-chair, along with
Boston Mayor Thomas M. Menino
and Fleet Bank President of
Consumer Banking Robert J. Higgins,
of a black-tie event to celebrate the
Program’s tenth anniversary.
Between those two dates, Hagins—
still the proud owner of the same
two-family house in Boston’s
Dorchester neighborhood—has been
followed by more than 2,100 other
lower-income, first-time homebuy-
ers. She has become Director of
Housing Education for the
Massachusetts Affordable Housing
Alliance (MAHA), the community-
based organization primarily
responsible for the Soft Second
Program’s creation and growth. 
Boston’s Soft Second Program gets
its name from the fact that partici-
pating homebuyers receive two
mortgages rather than one: a first
mortgage for 75 percent of the pur-
chase price and a second mortgage
for 20 percent (the program requires
a 5 percent down payment). The
interest rate on both mortgages is
50 basis points below the bank’s
two-point rate.1 The second mort-
gage is “soft” (for the first ten years)
in two ways—payments are interest-
only and payments may be further
reduced for qualifying homebuyers
by public subsidies. The Massa-
chusetts Housing Partnership Fund
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and Boston’s Department of
Neighborhood Development  also
fund loan loss reserves for each
bank equal to 10 percent of the
total value of the second mortgages
the bank has originated. The exis-
tence of the reserve fund makes it
possible for borrowers to avoid the
cost of private mortgage insurance,
while the banks are still protected
from credit losses. Affordability is
further increased by no payment of
points (even though, as noted
above, borrowers receive their
loans at 50 basis points below the
two-point interest rate) and the
provision of down payment and
closing cost assistance.
Initially dismissed by some bankers
as a “one-shot deal” when it
emerged from almost two years of
confrontation and finger-pointing,
the program is regarded in Boston
today as both unusually compre-
hensive and remarkably successful. 
by Jim Campen and Tom Callahan
O
Soft Second Program Celebrates            Years2000, the SSP delinquency rate was
2.5 percent in Boston (and 2.9 per-
cent statewide), compared to a
delinquency rate of 4.0 percent for
all mortgages in the state. The only
other targeted mortgage program in
Massachusetts with available delin-
quency data is that of the
Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency (MHFA), which sets its
income limit at 120 percent of the
metropolitan area median (rather
than the limit of 80 percent adopt-
ed by the SSP). Recent MHFA
(statewide) delinquency rates—for
example, 5.4 percent at the end of
December 2000—have been well
above those of the Soft Second
Program. Furthermore, foreclosures
on SSP loans have been rare. By the
end of 2000, only five of the 2,112
loans originated by the Boston SSP
had ended in foreclosure—a rate of
1 in 422, or 0.24 percent.
Members of the MAHA Homebuyers
Union have currently negotiated
Community Reinvestment Act
agreements with 14 banks for over
$500 million in below-market Soft
Second loans in Boston (including
two banks that had not yet made
their first loan by year-end 2000).
MAHA has also worked to create a
local secondary market for SSP first
mortgage loans. This effort bore
fruit in 1997, when the first securi-
ties backed by SSP first mortgages
were sold. Packaged by Fannie Mae,
the securities offered a rate of return
50 basis points below the market
level. Savings Bank Life Insurance
committed itself to buying $20 mil-
lion of these securities over the next
ten years, and had already fulfilled
40 percent of that commitment by
the end of 2000. The Life Initiative,
an investment entity established by
Massachusetts life insurance com-
panies, became the second buyer of
SSP mortgage-backed securities
with a $6 million investment.
Measuring Success
First, an examination of the income
levels of all SSP borrowers during
the ten-year history of the program,
shows that 32 percent of all SSP
homebuyers had incomes of
$25,000 or less, 60 percent had
incomes of $30,000 or less, and 94
percent had incomes of no more
than $40,000. Second, over half of
all Boston SSP loans during the
ten-year period, 1,098 loans, have
gone to low-income homebuyers—
those with incomes at or below 50
percent of the median family
income of the Boston metropolitan
area, as determined annually by
HUD; the low-income ceiling has
risen from $25,100 in 1991 to
$32,750 in 2000.
Although affordability was their
primary goal, MAHA’s Homebuyers
Union members have always rec-
ognized that there are no real ben-
efits to homebuyers—and their
neighborhoods—unless they are
able to remain homeowners. The
priority that the group has
attached to sustaining homeown-
ership is evidenced by its early
decision (reaffirmed on several
occasions) that homebuyers must
make a significant down payment.
MAHA’s low-income members
believe strongly that potential
buyers must demonstrate some
ability to save money in order to
adequately prepare themselves for
the expense of owning and main-
taining a home, especially an older
home in an urban neighborhood.
Consequently, the SSP requires
that at least 3 percent of the total
5 percent down payment come
from the buyer’s own funds.
Delinquency rates for SSP loans
have generally been somewhat
lower than the rates for all
Massachusetts mortgages. For
example, at the end of December
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Lessons Learned
For the last ten years, the Boston
Soft Second Program has been a
laboratory, of sorts, for community
groups, banks, insurance compa-
nies, and government agencies. The
experience gained suggests several
important lessons that are explained
below. One such lesson is that suc-
cess is a moving target. To keep up
with that target, it’s useful to identi-
fy challenges that are likely to con-
front the SSP in the near future.
Grassroots involvement is crucial.
From day one, the Soft Second
Program has benefited from an
extraordinary degree of involvement
from low- and moderate-income
members of MAHA. Members of
MAHA’s Homebuyers Union were
intimately involved in negotiating
the details of the program and they
were the guiding force in challeng-
ing bankers and government offi-
cials to increase the affordability of
these loans. Large community meet-
ings have convinced banks that
there remains a large, grassroots
constituency for genuinely afford-
able home mortgages.
You can’t stand still. 
As the financial system has changed
around the program, the SSP has
changed and evolved as well. It has
grown from three participating
banks in 1991 to nine in 2001. A
homebuyer can now get a loan from
Fleet Bank, the seventh largest bank
in the country, or from Hyde Park
Cooperative, an $82 million, two-
branch bank. The program started
with banks needing to retain both
first and second mortgages in their
portfolios. Today, Fannie Mae and
insurance companies provide an
outlet for the first mortgages. 
Get it in writing. 
Written agreements for the SSP
evolved from a one-page letter
from the bank to a ten-page mem-
orandum of understanding (MOU)
that spells out many significant
details. These MOUs have been use-
ful for resolving questions that arise
with the passage of time and
changing bank personnel. The more
formal documents have been par-
ticularly valuable in merger-related
negotiations conducted by MAHA
and other organizations. 
When the agreement is signed, the
work has just begun. 
This sage advice was offered to
Although affordability was their primary
goal, MAHA’s Homebuyers Union members
have always recognized that there are no
real benefits to homebuyers—and their
neighborhoods—unless they are able to
remain homeowners.sion would bring about the first real
test of the sustainability of SSP
homeownership during hard times.
While these challenges are serious,
the achievements—and the adapt-
ability—of the Boston Soft Second
Loan Program during its first ten
years provide grounds for optimism
about its ability to meet these and
other challenges that are bound to
arise in its second decade.
reflects the impact of the sustained
escalation of housing prices in the
city. On the one hand, potential
homebuyers find it increasingly dif-
ficult to find a house they can
afford. On the other hand, some
buyers have located houses they
could afford with the assistance of
the SSP, but they cannot buy them
because their prices exceed SSP
maximums. Early March 2001
increases in the price ceilings, the
second set of increases within a
year, will provide some relief from
the latter problem but do nothing to
address the underlying problem of
the erosion of affordability by con-
tinually rising house prices.
The most likely scenario leading to
lower housing prices—an economic
downturn—is not a remedy.
Potential homebuyers’ ability to
purchase new homes might be
reduced more by falling incomes
than it would be increased by
declining house prices. Furthermore,
the ability of SSP homeowners to
continue to make their monthly
payments in a timely fashion could
be seriously threatened by rising
unemployment and falling house-
hold incomes. The Boston SSP’s low
delinquency and foreclosure rates
have been achieved during the
longest uninterrupted economic
expansion in U.S. history. A reces-
MAHA in 1990, and the last ten
years have borne it out. There have
been countless hours of meetings
to implement, monitor, and renego-
tiate the agreements. MAHA has
added three new programs (home-
buyer counseling, homeowner edu-
cation, and foreclosure prevention)
to help support the SSP. It organ-
ized large community meetings
focused on the program in 1994,
1996, 1997, and 1999.
Partners are essential. 
Bankers have spent numerous hours
in boardrooms and community
rooms discussing details of imple-
menting the SSP. The Massachusetts
Housing Partnership, Boston’s De-
partment of Neighborhood Devel-
opment, and other government
agencies have expended enormous
time and energy to make the pro-
gram a success. Other neighbor-
hood-based nonprofits have promot-
ed the program through outreach
and workshops. The Massachusetts
Community & Banking Council has
been instrumental in monitoring
delinquencies. Public officials and
private companies have provided
financial support. The list could go
on. The program has been inclusive,
and a wide variety of public and pri-
vate organizations share in the cred-
it for the SSP’s achievements.
Challenges Ahead
Between 1990 and 1999, the share
of Boston home-purchase loans
made by mortgage companies and
other lenders not subject to CRA for
their Boston lending has tripled,
from 21.9 percent of all loans at the
beginning of the decade to 61.9 per-
cent at the end. During this time,
however, no mortgage company has
seriously explored the option of
joining the Boston SSP. As barriers
between different financial indus-
tries continue to crumble, con-
sumers may soon be able to get
mortgages from their insurance
agents. Public comments by top
officers of Boston’s biggest banks
have raised the possibility that some
institutions might decide to get out
of the highly competitive, low-mar-
gin business of making mortgage
loans. Increasing, or even maintain-
ing, lender commitments to the SSP
in this changing institutional envi-
ronment could be difficult.
The declining number of Boston
SSP loans in the last three years
17 c & b
Between 1990 and
1999, the share of
Boston home-pur-
chase loans made by
mortgage companies
and other lenders not
subject to CRA . . . has
tripled . . . . During
this time, however, no
mortgage company
has seriously explored
the option of joining
the Boston SSP.
Endnote
1. A bank’s two-point mortgage rate will have a lower interest rate
than a similar mortgage without points. Consumers can “pay” points,
each of which is equal to 1 percent of the mortgage balance, to reduce
their interest rates, which in turn reduces monthly payments.
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Editor’s Note
This article is adapted from a paper presented at the Federal Reserve
System’s Community Affairs Research Conference held April 5-6,
2001. To read the full paper,  which provides an in-depth analysis of
the program’s impact in a changing financial services environment,
visit www.chicagofed.org/cedric/2001/Aprilconference.cfm.CRA statute and regulations for
guidance. Banking institutions alone
are subject to the law, so we focused
on them exclusively and did not
consider credit unions or mortgage
companies. Next, we determined that
a CRA-related loan was one extend-
ed to a lower-income household
anywhere in a banking institution’s
local community or to a borrower of
any income in a lower-income
neighborhood within that communi-
ty. We used a similar definition for
small business lending.
Note that these defini-
tions exclude about half
of all lower-income




more difficult. In principle, to assess
a law or regulation’s influence on
loan performance and profitability,
one must measure its “marginal”
effect; ideally, this would mean con-
sidering only the additional loans
made because of the law. Such an
assessment, however, is impossible
in practice because one cannot spec-
ify the subset of loans that are made
solely because of the CRA. In the
end, we chose to examine the per-
formance and profitability of all
loans made in conformity with the
CRA; in other words, those that met
our definition of a CRA-related loan.
This approach, though not ideal,
complied with the language of the
law that mandated the study.
To answer the third question—
whether the research already avail-
able was capable of satisfying the
congressional request—Board staff
reviewed the existing studies of the
performance and profitability of
CRA-related lending. We found that
such research as did exist was too
limited to meet our needs. Nearly all
of it had focused on the performance
and profitability of home lending,
and most of this concerned the rela-
tively narrow group of loans made
under affordable-home-loan pro-
grams. Although they target much of
programs and have established pro-
cedures to mitigate the credit risk
associated with such loans. 
Although the CRA’s effects on lend-
ing to lower-income populations
and neighborhoods are difficult to
assess, such lending has increased
substantially over the past decade or
so. For example, home-purchase
lending to lower-income households
has increased 86 percent since 1993
(compared to about 50 percent for
higher-income households). Lending
to borrowers in lower-income neigh-
borhoods also has risen sharply
(nearly 80 percent) since 1993. 
Despite all this experience, little sys-
tematic information has been pub-
licly available about performance
and profitability, either for CRA-
related lending activities as a whole
or for the loans extended under CRA
special lending programs. 
CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE
In November 1999, the U.S.
Congress asked the Federal Reserve
Board to do a comprehensive study
on the performance (that is, the
delinquency and default rates)
and profitability of loans made in
conformity with the CRA. Before
responding to their request, the
Board needed to address three
basic questions: What is a CRA
loan? How does one measure the
effect of a law or regulation on
the profitability and performance
of lending? Is previous research
adequate to fulfill the congres-
sional request?
In considering the first question—
how to define a CRA loan—the
Reserve Board staff looked to the
In November 1999, the U.S.
Congress asked the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System to conduct a comprehensive
study of loans made under the
Community Reinvestment Act of
1977. The Board’s study focused on
the loans’ delinquency and default
rates—their performance—as well as
their profitability. This article reports
the results of the study.
Responding to the CRA, banking
institutions have used various meth-
ods to expand lending to lower-
income customers and those in
lower-income neighborhoods, but
their approaches fall into two broad
types, both typically involving spe-
cial marketing and outreach. In one
approach, lenders have sought addi-
tional CRA-related customers who
would qualify for market-priced
loans using traditional standards of
creditworthiness. In the other,
lenders have gained customers by
modifying their underwriting guide-
lines or loan pricing. Many banking
institutions, especially the larger
ones, have established or participate
in special programs to foster lending.
Special lending programs vary wide-
ly but they often feature more flexi-
ble credit-underwriting guidelines
than those used for other products;
education and counseling for
prospective borrowers; enhanced,
targeted marketing of credit prod-
ucts; and coordination with a wide
range of third parties, both private
and public. In addition, some bank-
ing institutions offer pricing incen-
tives for loans made under these
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QUOTATIONS PROVIDED BY COMMUNITIIES & BANKING
The question we need to ask is not
‘How profitable is this [CRA lend-
ing], but what is the overall value
of this lending?’
–James Head, President, National
Economic Development and Law Center
Remarks at the Federal Reserve’s 2001
Community Affairs Conference
There  is  no  appropriate  sound  bite  to
describe CRA profitability. 
–Robert Avery
Remarks at the Federal Reserve’s 2001 
Community Affairs Conferencethat compromised confidentiality. In
preparing the survey instrument, we
received input from many sources,
including banking institutions,
community-based and nonprofit
organizations, and members of
Congress and their staffs. 
The survey had limited goals. It is
especially important to note that its
results do not represent a cost/bene-
fit analysis of the CRA. Consistent
with the Congress’ mandate, the sur-
vey focused only on the perform-
ance and profitability of CRA-relat-
ed lending. It did not examine
investment and service activities
that banking institutions may have
undertaken because of the CRA. It
did not address the CRA’s effects on
local communities and included lit-
tle information about its benefits to
individual institutions. The survey
collected information about activi-
ties in only four loan-product cate-
gories (the most significant ones for
most institutions). These included
home purchase and refinance lend-
ing, home improvement lending,
small business lending, and commu-
nity development lending.
SPECIAL CHALLENGES
Three of the challenges posed by this
survey warrant particular comment.
Because of statutory deadlines
the same population as the CRA,
loans extended under affordable-
home-loan programs often deviate
from the definition of a CRA loan in
a few important respects: They are
often extended by institutions, such
as mortgage companies, that are not
subject to the CRA; they frequently
include loans made by banking
institutions outside their local com-
munities; and they sometimes are
made to borrowers whose incomes
exceed our lower-income criterion. 
Our review of previous loan per-
formance research showed wide
variation in the experience of indi-
vidual banking institutions, depend-
ing on such factors as their location
and the kinds of approaches they
used to extend credit. The delin-
quency rates reported are generally
higher than those for other loans,
while default rates are slightly high-
er or about the same.
Two types of research on loan prof-
itability have been conducted, one
based on a special survey of banking
institutions’ experiences and the
other on statistical analysis of stan-
dardized reports filed by all banking
institutions. The Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City’s 1995 survey
focused on home-purchase lending;
its main finding was that CRA-relat-
ed lending was profitable, but some-
what less so than traditional lending.
Statistical analysis of Call Report
data, merged with data on home-pur-
chase lending, showed
that institutions doing rel-
atively more lower-
income mortgage lending




existing research did not
provide adequate data to
satisfy Congress’ request,
the Board decided to under-
take some new research. To
this end, the 500 largest retail bank-
ing institutions were surveyed about
their lending experience, focusing
on CRA-related loans. This focus
included special lending programs,
which are sometimes an important
aspect of institutions’ CRA-related
lending activities. We selected the
500 largest retail banking institu-
tions because they account for
about 75 percent of all CRA-related
lending. Respondents were assured
that the data reported would not be
disclosed to the public in a manner
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imposed by the Congress, banking
institutions had little time to prepare
responses. In fact, we continued to
accept responses for nearly a month
beyond the deadline. The timing of
our survey coincided with due dates
for the annual reports that institu-
tions must file under the provisions
of the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act and the CRA, as well as several
other regulatory reports.
In addition, we encountered some
confusion as to the definition of a
CRA loan. The definition was not
well understood by all survey
respondents, some of whom equated
CRA loans with loans made under
special lending programs. 
Finally, the study used return on
equity as a measure of profitability.
To calculate it, we sought very com-
prehensive data, asking respondents
to include all sources of costs and
revenues. Survey responses and fol-
low-up phone calls, however, indi-
cated that some lenders had consid-
ered cost of capital and others had
not. As a result, much of our analy-
sis focused on a relative ranking of
profitability for CRA and nonCRA
lending within a bank. Such internal
comparisons are not affected by fail-
ure to consider the cost of capital or
any other factor, as long as it is
reported consistently within a bank.
1. SURVEY RESULTS: CRA-
RELATED  LENDING
We received responses from 143 of
the 500 institutions to which we sent
the survey (a 28.6 percent response
rate). These responses and our fol-
low-up telephone contacts revealed
that banking institutions generally
do not track profitability and per-
formance separately for CRA-related
lending, so our report emphasized
qualitative results regarding prof-
itability. Because fewer than half of
Our experience has been that as rates move up and down, conven-
tional mortgage and small-business borrowers will refinance while
the iron is hot; however, those receiving CRA loans might not be
able to refinance because of how the assistance programs helped
to get that loan off the ground. What you end up with is CRA port-
folio characteristics that are more stable than in a conventional
mortgage portfolio. While the rule of thumb says that the average
person  stays  in  a  mortgage  for  seven  years,  for  the  first-time
homebuyer or low-income homebuyer, it’s often one and a half to
two times that.
–Richard Staples, CRA Officer, People’s Savings Bank of Brockton
April 2001
In  Massachusetts,  the  Soft  Second
Program  is  an  exception  to  the  general
statement on the delinquency of special
lending  programs.  This  program  has
undertaken  a  large  number  of  origina-
tions with low delinquencies, resulting in
higher profitability than might be expect-
ed of a CRA portfolio.
–Richard Staplesthe respondents answered quantita-
tive questions on performance, one
must be cautious when using these
responses to draw qualitative infer-
ences comparing the performance of
CRA-related and other lending. 
The results varied by loan product.
Home purchase and refinance lend-
ing has the largest origination vol-
ume by far ($570 bil-
lion, of which about
10 percent is CRA-
related). Responses
indicated that over-




or marginally profitable for most
institutions. On a dollar-weighted
basis, about 85 percent of survey
respondents said that their CRA-
related lending as a whole was at
least marginally profitable. However,
CRA-related home purchase and
refinance lending was reported to be
less profitable and to have similar or
higher delinquency rates than other
home purchase and refinance lend-
ing. Concerning this product, about
63 percent of respondents said that
their CRA-related lending was less
profitable than their overall lending.
Differences are less dramatic when
measured on a per-institution basis. 
One of the strongest relationships
revealed by the survey concerns the
correlation between an institution’s
size and the profitability and per-
formance of its CRA-related lend-
ing. Large banks were less likely
than small banks to report that
CRA-related lending is profitable,
and much more likely to say that it
is less profitable than their overall
lending. A large proportion of
respondents in all bank-size cate-
gories reported that CRA-related
and other home purchase and refi-
nance loans have very similar orig-
ination and servicing costs, credit
losses, and pricing on a per-institu-
tion basis. However, the respon-
dents who did report differences
most often said they had lower
prices or higher costs or credit loss-
es for CRA-related home purchase
and refinance loans than for others. 
HOME IMPROVEMENT AND  REFI-
NANCE LENDING
The results for home improvement
lending ($12 billion in originations,
of which about 18 percent is CRA-
related) are similar to those for
home purchase and refinance lend-
ing, although fewer differences
between CRA-related and other
home improvement
lending were reported.
The vast majority of
respondents in all size
categories said that
origination and servic-
ing costs, credit losses,
and prices for home
improvement lending
were about the same
for CRA-related loans






all ($117 billion in
originations) and CRA-
related small business
lending are both prof-
itable. They reported
few differences in per-
formance and prof-
itability between CRA-
related and other small
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business lending. The same was true
of origination and servicing costs,
credit losses, and pricing. These
results may reflect the relatively
large proportion (about 50 percent)




Virtually all respondents reported
that community development lend-
ing ($13 billion in originations) is
at least marginally profitable.
Comparative questions were not
asked for this category of loans
because it was unlikely that we
would be able to construct valid
comparison groups from banking
institutions’ loan portfolios. 
2. SURVEY RESULTS: CRA
SPECIAL LENDING PROGRAMS
Evidence suggests that CRA special
lending programs ($11 billion in
originations across all loan-product
categories) are relatively small and
account for a small proportion of the
loans extended by most banking
institutions. Only 1 percent of
respondents reported that they
established these programs solely to
obtain a “satisfactory” or “outstand-
ing” CRA rating. A large share said
they established their programs to
meet the local community’s credit
needs and to promote its growth and
stability. Programs have a wide
range of characteristics but they
commonly feature altered under-
writing standards. About three-quar-
ters of all programs involve third
parties, such as government entities,
nonprofits and lending consortia,
which are often a source of subsidies
and provide many services such as
screening of prospective borrowers.
In addition, third parties often share
the credit risk of a loan with the
lender. A majority of CRA special
lending programs were reported to
be profitable or marginally prof-
itable. About 25 percent of them
were described as unprofitable or
marginally unprofitable. 
Here we mention an interesting
debate about interpreting results from
the CRA special lending programs.
One side maintains that these pro-
grams represent the marginal impact
of the CRA—“the bite of the law”—and
therefore are the appropriate focus for
analyses of the CRA’s effects. The
other side maintains that these pro-
grams exist for several different rea-
On how the 1995 CRA influences profitability:
But because of the regulation’s emphasis
on performance . . . in some markets there
is  extreme  competition  for  ‘CRA  loans.’
Competition is so stiff that profit margins
are  under  significant  pressure,  scaring
away smaller community banks. . . . And
some institutions feel compelled perhaps
to make loans for the sake of getting them
on their books—maybe with loan terms
that are too flexible, or to borrowers who
are only marginally credit-worthy. These
trends, if they continue, threaten to play
into the hands of those who argue that
CRA  lending  is  an  unprofitable  business.
Our goal must be CRA regulations that fos-
ter sustainable community reinvestment.
–Ellen Seidman, OTS Director, 
National Association of Affordable Housing 
Lenders speech, October 5, 2000
We have also found that pre- and post-pur-
chase counseling have a very important role
in the profitability of CRA loans. 
–Richard Staplesresponse rate was 28.6
percent, the institutions
that responded are esti-
mated to account for
between 45 and 50 per-
cent of all the CRA-
related lending in each
loan-product category.
Furthermore, statistical







The survey data are primari-
ly reflections of the experiences of
larger banking institutions in a par-
ticularly healthy economic environ-
ment. Experiences may differ for
small institutions or under different
economic conditions. Our current
research efforts are focused on a
fuller assessment of the section of
the survey that concerns special
lending programs.
sons, only one of which is to respond
to the CRA, and do not necessarily
measure the bite of the law.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The report does not characterize the
overall performance and profitabili-
ty of banking institutions’ CRA-
related lending because it does not
cover all the activities of a given
bank. However, the performance and
profitability of most institutions’
CRA-related home purchase and
refinance and small business lending
provide a good indication of the per-
formance and profitability of their
CRA-related lending as a whole,
because these two categories are the
most important ones for the majori-
ty of banks. The relatively low
response rate to the survey does not
necessarily imply that its results are
idiosyncratic. In particular, we found
no evidence that the survey’s results
are not broadly representative of the
experiences of the 500 institutions
considered together. Although the
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
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in the Division of Research and
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EDITOR’S NOTE
The complete study can be found at
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
surveys/craloansurvey/
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Participation by banking institu-
tions in the Federal Reserve Board’s
Survey of the Performance and
Profitability of CRA-Related
Lending was voluntary. On January
21, 2000, each prospective respon-
dent was mailed a questionnaire
accompanied by a cover letter from
Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Alan Greenspan explaining the
purpose of the survey and seeking
voluntary cooperation in the study.
The sample of institutions selected
to participate in the survey consist-
ed of roughly the largest 500 retail
banking institutions-400 commer-
The  study,  which  was  released  today,
indicates that the great majority of CRA-
related home and small business lending
is  profitable.  This  study  is  consistent
with an earlier study conducted in 1997
by two Federal Reserve Board economists
finding that banks offering a high num-
ber  of  loans  to  low-  and  moderate-
income borrowers are slightly more prof-
itable than banks that make few loans to
these populations.
–National Community Reinvestment Coalition,
press release, July 17, 2000
The results of the study are clear and consistent: CRA lending
is significantly less profitable than ordinary lending, and the
most unprofitable CRA loans are those that are made through
special lending deals with CRA specialists and other third par-
ties. I am astounded by the data that shows every third dollar
lent through these special deals is lent at a loss. The results of
the Federal Reserve’s study undermine the often-heard claim
that CRA lending is good business that, prior to the CRA law,
banks had ignored.
–Senator Phil Gramm, Chairman, Senate Banking Committee,
press release, July 17, 2000
cial banks and 100 savings associa-
tions. The sample was limited to the
largest banking institutions
because they account for the vast
majority (estimated at more than 70
percent) of CRA-related lending
nationwide. Survey responses were
received from 143 banking institu-
tions—114 commercial banks and
29 savings associations. Despite
their relatively small number, the
143 survey respondents accounted
for about one-half of the assets of
the more than 10,000 U.S. banking
institutions in existence as of
December 31, 1999.
PARTICIPATION IN THE SURVEY
Response rates varied markedly by
the asset size of the institution.
More than 80 percent of the largest
surveyed banking institutions
(assets of $30 billion or more as of
December 31, 1999) returned a sur-
vey (27 out of 33 sampled institu-
tions in this asset category). In con-
trast, only about 19 percent ( 72 out
of 363) of the smallest surveyed
banking institutions (assets of
between $0.950 billion and $4.999
billion) responded. Institutions with
assets of between $5 billion and
$29.999 billion had a response rate
of about 40 percent.3
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business loan, or buying a car or a house, a credit score looms
large. It may influence both the likelihood of your getting the
loan and the interest rate you will be charged. This release of
information comes after the United States Congress started
thinking about making credit scores public to consumers
applying for credit. 
Consumers often sit in auto dealerships or mortgage bankers’
offices and wonder (or agonize) about whether they will qual-
ify for a loan. Now that consumers are able to know their
credit scores, their agonizing should abate. However, it will
now be incumbent upon consumers to understand how they
got their credit scores and how to keep them as high as possi-
ble. The release of credit scores is also beneficial to consumers
who may not know that they have good credit and, therefore,
are eligible for low-interest loans through traditional lenders. 
First of all, it’s important to know the source of the credit
score and who has access to it. The most frequently used cred-
it score in the mortgage industry is called a FICO® score,
named after the company that devised it, Fair, Isaac and
Company Inc. Fair, Isaac derives the score based on financial
information from your creditors, such as your history of pay-
ing bills on time. The score acts like an amalgam of financial
information about you. In return, mortgage lenders, finance
companies, and landlords can access your FICO score when
making decisions about extending credit to you. The credit
score is used as a measure of how risky a credit consumer you
are, based on your patterns of financial behavior. Keep in
mind that factors other than your credit score, such as your
employment history and income, also influence creditors’
evaluation of your creditworthiness.
The Five Factors
Having covered the basics, the following is a listing of five fac-
tors that contribute to your credit score, with a brief explana-
tion of what each factor means, how to improve it, and its rel-
ative importance in the overall score. The results of these five
factors added together compose a score ranging from roughly
300 to 850, with an inverse relationship between your credit
score and the predicted level of risk you pose to the creditor. A
high credit score (700-850) means that you are a relatively low
credit risk, and a low credit score (300-500) means that you are
a relatively high credit risk. 
Track Record 
Your history of paying bills on time
figures prominently in determining
your credit score. Your recent track
record counts more than your dated
track record. While a 30-day late
payment won’t affect your score as
negatively as a 90-day late pay-
ment, the bottom line is to make
your best effort to pay your bills on
time because this factor has the
greatest single influence on your
credit score. It is important to know
that timely payment of bills such as
those for phone and electricity serv-
ice will not influence your score.
Only credit accounts are followed by
Fair, Isaac, unless one of your
accounts, such as your electricity
bill, gets sent to collection.
Percentage of your total credit score:
35 percent
Amounts Owed
If you have high balances on a num-
ber of credit cards and installment
loans, this situation is hurting your
credit score. Even if you have
numerous credit cards that don’t
have high balances, your credit
score could be impaired. Numerous
credit cards heighten the “potential”
for accumulating high balances that
could jeopardize your ability to
repay your creditors at any given
time. Optimally, own one credit
card, use it judiciously, and pay it
off monthly. It is also best to keep
installment loans, if you have them,
at manageable levels. Percentage of
your total credit score: 30 percent
Length of Credit
History
The longer you have had a credit his-
tory, the more likely you are to score
better in this category. If you are rel-
atively new with credit, however,
you can still score well on this factor
if the rest of your factors score well.
To determine your length of credit
history, Fair, Isaac looks at the age of
your oldest credit account and aver-
ages the ages of all your credit
accounts. This is why new credit,
mentioned below, can be detrimental
to your score. Percentage of your
total credit score: 15 percent
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by John Galligan
The Big $core! 
Finally , there will be no more talking
behind your back, financially speaking. As of
March 2001, every consumer can know what
bankers, creditors, and loan officers could
access about their applicants—their credit
scores. Lifting the veil on credit scores is a big
deal. When it comes to getting a credit card orFICO scores are only as good as the information they are
based on, which is why it’s important that the three
national credit bureaus, Equifax, Experian, and
TransUnion, have the correct information about you.
Each of these credit bureaus can produce FICO scores
based on the information they maintain about you. And
as I found out, they may be inaccurately representing
your current financial position.
In anticipation of securing a loan with the best rate pos-
sible to buy a vacation property on Cape Cod, I checked
into my credit reports to certify that everything was in
good order. To get started, I ordered reports online from
the three national credit bureaus, Equifax, Experian, and
Trans Union, paying $8.50 for each. (Massachusetts and
Vermont are two of the six states that have enacted leg-
islation requiring the three major credit bureaus to pro-
vide consumers with one free credit report per year. In
addition, you are entitled to one free credit report every
year if you: believe your report is inaccurate due to fraud,
have been denied credit within the past 60 days, are on
welfare, or are unemployed and plan to seek employment
within 60 days.)
Reading through the reports was disturbing because they
showed accounts as “open” that I was confident had been
closed years ago, showed accounts as “open” that were
with stores that had gone out of business years ago, and
showed a mortgage as “active” that had been paid off
through a refinancing completed two years ago. In all, I
identified a dozen errors among the three reports. It’s
important to note that simply closing accounts does not
erase them from your credit report, and they may still
influence your credit score.
I went to work to correct these errors. I wrote to each
credit reporting bureau explaining the items in question,
and invested a substantial amount of time and effort in
the process. As required, each bureau mailed me correct-
ed versions of the reports within 30 days. 
Leaving nothing to chance, I then ordered my credit score
from www.myfico.com. I paid $12.95 for the information,
and received the report online the next day showing that
my score was in the high 700s—enough to qualify for the
best rates possible, according to the analysis provided
with the score. Armed with this information, I am ready
to scour the market, confident that I am a consumer with
the power to shop around for the most competitive offer-
ings. You might say that I should be given credit for my
due diligence!
5
Type of Credit in
Use
This factor reflects whether you have
a “healthy” mix of credit. Here’s
what an “unhealthy” mix of credit
would look like: numerous credit
cards with outstanding balances,
plus large mortgage and auto loans.
Doing well with this factor means
not overextending yourself with
credit. A “healthy” mix of credit
would entail managing a reasonable
number of credit card accounts and
other loans with timely payments. It
does not mean having one of each
type of credit account. Using credit
cards responsibly, rather than not
having them at all, is a boost to your
score. Percentage of your total credit
score: 10 percent
4
23 c & b
New Credit
If you have applied for or have
obtained new credit cards recently,
you are reducing your credit score.
Again, the potential for getting into
trouble with multiple cards is at play
here. Low introductory rate offers
swell the mail and numerous retail-
ers offer discounts with the opening
of an account. Yet with these offers
you are also getting another listing
on your credit report that could
count against you. Retail store cred-
it, in addition, is often provided by
finance companies, and a number of
these accounts may reduce your
credit score. It is best to open new
credit lines only when necessary.
Percentage of your total credit score:
10 percent
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Also, the Spring 2000 and Winter
2001 issues of Communities &
Banking feature in-depth articles
about credit scoring.